Business email compromise (BEC) is a scam in which criminals email as someone the victim already trusts, such as a boss or supplier, from a lookalike address or a hijacked real mailbox, to get money or sensitive data sent to them. It rarely involves malware: in most of the business email compromise examples below, a believable message about a real payment was enough.

The FBI received 24,768 BEC complaints in 2025, with reported losses of more than $3.04 billion, up from $2.77 billion in 2024. That makes BEC the second-costliest cyber-enabled fraud after investment fraud (FBI IC3 2025 report). In Europe, CERT.at reported rising BEC attempts against Austrian organisations in August 2026 (CERT.at).

How business email compromise works

  1. Pick a payment flow. The attacker picks people who move money or hold payroll data: finance, accounts payable, HR, executive assistants, homebuyers, title and law firms.
  2. Get a believable sender. The attacker uses a lookalike address, such as a domain one character off or the right display name over the wrong address, or takes over the real mailbox through a phishing page that also captures the MFA code (CERT.at).
  3. Watch and wait. Inside a real mailbox, the attacker reads mail until a large payment is due and hides replies with inbox rules (Microsoft).
  4. Make the request. The message asks for an urgent, secret transfer for the “CEO”, pays a supplier into a new account, changes wiring details for a house purchase, or asks HR to change a salary account.
  5. Cash out fast through mule accounts and crypto exchanges (FBI IC3).

BEC hits any mail service (Microsoft 365, Google Workspace, webmail) on Windows, macOS and especially phones, where mail apps hide the full sender address. Follow-ups come on Teams, WhatsApp or SMS, or as a phone call from the “boss”; a call in a cloned voice is deepfake fraud.

Why business email compromise works on people

“The attackers’ main tool is a credible story,” says CERT.at. The amount, the supplier and the project are all real. Only the bank details are wrong. Rank and urgency lower scrutiny, and AI tools write official-sounding executive emails (FBI IC3 2025 report).

Warning signs of business email compromise

  • A new bank account, or a switch from cheque to transfer, for a known supplier or employee.
  • Urgency plus secrecy, or pressure to skip an approval step.
  • A sender who “can’t be reached by phone”.
  • A change of writing style inside an existing thread.
  • A sender or reply-to domain that is almost right.

Business email compromise examples

Children’s Healthcare of Atlanta (2023, healthcare).

A hacker got into the email of the hospital’s furniture supplier and changed the bank account on file. The hospital wired $5.3 million to an account held by a CPA who laundered it; about $4 million was recovered. A message from a supplier’s real address proves nothing about the bank details in it (Atlanta News First).

Town of Arlington, Massachusetts (2023–24, local government).

Attackers inside town email accounts saw a contractor on the high school building project raise a payment problem. They then posed as that contractor from a genuine-looking domain and asked to be paid by transfer instead of cheque. Four monthly payments totalling $445,945.73 went to the criminals before the contractor said it had not been paid. A change in how a supplier is paid is a bank-detail change (StateScoop).

“Payroll pirate” attacks on US universities (2025, higher education).

This payroll diversion variant counts as BEC because the attackers took over staff email accounts to reach the pay system and hid the change notices. Emails about illness exposure or pay updates led to fake login pages that captured MFA codes; the attackers then entered Workday through single sign-on and changed staff salary accounts at three universities. A pay-account change notice nobody asked for is a reason to call HR (Microsoft).

Massachusetts workers union (2023, trade union).

An email from a domain one character off the investment manager’s real one gave a new account for an already arranged $6.4 million payment. About $5.3 million of it was later traced and forfeited. The full sender domain is worth reading on every payment email (DOJ, The Register).

Lexington, Kentucky (2022, local government and nonprofit).

Criminals intercepted email between the city and a rent-relief nonprofit and sent new bank details. The city wired about $4 million in three payments. The receiving bank froze the account and all the money was recovered. Recovery in Lexington depended on the bank freezing the account quickly (WEKU).

Singapore healthcare company on Teams (2026, healthcare).

Singapore police class this chat-app variant as BEC: the same executive-payment fraud, moved off email. A fake chairman and managing director in a Teams group chat asked the CFO for a S$120,000 transfer. A rule that payment slips need a physical signature stopped it. The signature rule held because it did not depend on anyone spotting the fake (Malay Mail).

How to prevent business email compromise

Personal habits to prevent business email compromise

  • Confirm any change of bank details or payment method by calling back on a number already on file, never one in the message. Homebuyers should do the same with wiring instructions from a title company (FBI IC3, DOJ).
  • Open the pay or HR portal directly when an email asks for an update, because the link in the message may lead to a fake login page.
  • Call the bank at once about a suspected fraud, so the receiving account can be frozen, as it was for Lexington (FBI IC3).

Security controls to prevent business email compromise

  • Require a second approver for any payment to a new or changed account, with no exception for rank, deadlines or requests for secrecy, because pressure is what these scams run on.
  • Protect mailboxes with phishing-resistant MFA such as passkeys, so a stolen password alone cannot open them.
  • Have mail admins alert on new inbox and forwarding rules, block auto-forwarding to outside domains and set the DMARC policy to reject, so other mail servers refuse mail that fakes the company’s domain (CERT.at).
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